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Abstract 
 
In the United Kingdom, as in other countries, Third Sector Organisations (TSOs) have 
been drawn towards income sources associated with trading activities (Teasdale, 2010), 
but many remain reliant on grant funding to support such activities (Chell, 2007). Using 
a multivariate analysis approach and data from the National Survey of Charities and 
Social Enterprises (NSCSE), it is found that trading activities are used relatively 
commonly in deprived areas. These organisations are also more likely to attempt to 
access public sector funds. This suggests policy-makers need to consider the impact of 
funding cuts on TSOs in the most deprived areas as TSOs are unlikely achieve their 
objectives without continuing support.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Under the current and previous UK government administrations, a third sector which 
utilises social enterprise activities that make use of government contracts and income 
from trading activities is increasingly recognised as having the potential to create a 
more sustainable method of providing social and community services (Dart, 2004). 
Social enterprise is defined by Wei-Skillern et al. (2007, page 4) as “innovative, social 
value-creating activity that can occur within or across the non-profit, business or 
government sectors’. Frumkin and Keating (2011) highlight the importance of revenue 
diversification as a component of social enterprise, to avoid over dependence on a single 
source. With the state’s ability and willingness to support Third Sector Organisations 
(TSOs) in continual decline (Diochon, and Anderson, 2009), it is unsurprising to see 
that both previous and current government administrations have actively promoted a 
market orientated approach within their policies towards the third sector (Sepulveda, 
2009; Cabinet Office, 2010; Mohan, 2012). Trading activities, thus have the potential to 
replace at least some of the funding drawn from other sources, particular public sector 
obligations (Amin, 2009). 
There have been attempts to explore whether the market orientated approach is 
appropriate for all TSOs (Weisbrod, 1998; Liao et al., 2001; McBrearty, 2007). One 
particular question that remains unanswered is whether social enterprise in replacing 
public sector funding with income from trading activities is sustainable in the most 
deprived areas over a longer period (Amin et al., 2002). Given the uneven spread of 
social deprivation and the need to be closely linked to the communities served, it is 
reasonable to assume that considerable differences can be found between TSOs serving 
geographical areas with different levels of deprivation (Salomon, 1987; Mohan, 2003; 
Amin, 2009; Williams et al., 2011; Clifford et al., 2013). However, although the greater 
need might make socially orientated trading activities more prevalent in more deprived 
areas (IFF Research, 2005), a lack of resources and skills in these areas may make such 
activities unsustainable in the longer-term (Amin et al., 2002). Therefore, it is 
unsurprising to find that whilst in general there has been an over reliance on public 
sector funding amongst all TSOs (Anheier et al., 1997; Chell et al., 2005; Chell, 2007), 
such reliance is particularly acute in the most deprived areas (Clifford et al., 2010; 
Clifford et al., 2013). However, greater supply of public funds in these locations may 
also play a role. This means that both the current and future government spending cuts, 
which are scheduled to last until 2018 (Kane et al., 2013; Clark et al., 2012), may lead 
to more TSOs seeking to become more self-sustaining using private funding from 
trading activities or public sector contracts, but to what extent this is possible in more 
deprived areas is unclear. As such policy makers at a more local level may need to 
consider what support need to be provided given local social and economic conditions 
(Westwood, 2011). 
Using data from the National Survey of Charities and Social Enterprises 
(NSCSE) conducted in 2010, this paper explores the use of earned income as a source 
of funding for TSOs and the extent to which this can replace public sector finance in the 
form of grants and contracts. In particular, the reliance on public sector finance and the 
use of trading activities as an alternative is explored for those TSOs operating in more 
deprived areas. A multi-level regression approach is adopted to control for a variety of 
organisational characteristic differences, whilst allowing for the potential of 
unobservable area level effects. This allows the investigation of the extent to which the 
Third Sector can successfully contribute to public service provision in the face of 
reduced public sector funding through the use of trading activities as an income source. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section examines 
the literature relating to the use of the Third Sector to provide public services and the 
funding arrangements associated with this. Particular attention is paid to those studies 
considering the potential of earned income to act as an alternative to public sector and 
more traditional sources of funding. Section 3 reviews the literature challenging the 
market orientated view, which casts doubt on this approach’s suitability within certain 
settings. Section 4 concentrates on the evidence relating to the association between local 
deprivation and government policies influencing the third sector in a UK context. 
Section 5 introduces the NSCSE data and methodology used in the study. Section 6 
presents the analysis of the relationship between Third Sector funding and economic 
deprivation of the local community within which a TSO operates, whilst Section 7 
summarises and provides policy conclusions. 
 
2. Earned Income from Contracts and Trading Activities – the Solution to the 
Financing of the Third Sector? 
 
The development of voluntary and community sector organisations is seen as crucial in 
building social capital and regeneration (HM Treasury, 2006; Westwood, 2011). Within 
the UK context, the social economy or the ‘third sector’ politically came to the fore 
under the Labour administration of the late 1990s and early years of the twenty first 
century (Giddens, 1998; Pearce, 2003; Haugh, and Kitson, 2007), which continued into 
the subsequent Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition. Authors such as Proulx et al. 
(2007) and Chartrand (2004) note a similar pattern in other developed countries 
(Sweden and Canada respectively). Although a variety of reasons have been proposed 
for Governments’ interest in the social economy including those associated with 
efficiency of provision and potential to access to reach hard to reach groups due to long-
standing relationships with the communities that they serve (Wainwright, 2002; HM 
Treasury, 2007), others have argued that a desire to reduce state obligations by 
stimulating a “social market” for welfare can also be an important motivating factor 
(Austin et al., 2006; Amin, 2009; Westwood, 2011; Sellick, 2014).  
However, with social needs becoming more complex, the challenge of meeting 
them is exacerbated by decreases in state funding and philanthropic giving (Charity 
Commission, 2010), as well as rising costs, increased regulation and accountability 
(Choi et al., 2005; Morris et al., 2007; Eikenberry, 2009; Muñoz, 2009).  Social 
enterprise in applying a business-like approach to achieve social objectives in a more 
efficient and financially sustainable manner (Dart, 2004; Sepulveda, 2009; Mswaka and 
Aluko, 2014), it is hoped that state grant contribution can be substantially reduced 
(Birch, and Whittam, 2006). This follows a trend of reducing public expenditure to a 
level comparable with that of the USA (Taylor-Gooby, 2012). In real terms, when 
accounting for the effects of inflation, the third sector in 2012/2013 has seen its income 
decrease in comparison to 2006/07 (Kane et al., 2013; Clark et al., 2012). These cost 
concerns have intensified with the substantial economic problems faced by the UK 
economy, with both household confidence and employment levels remaining low after 
the deep recession in the late-2000s, both of which could influence state and household 
support of the Third Sector (Hughes, and Luksetich, 2008). With the moral legitimacy 
of the ideology of the welfare-state diminished considerably (Dart, 2004), it is of no 
surprise that the Government has vigorously promoted TSOs that rely on earned income 
as one possible route to achieving economic regeneration of deprived areas through 
processes of better community engagement and public service delivery (Giddens, 1998; 
Kerlin, 2006). Although, others have questioned the potential for the social economy 
and social capital to flourish in areas with limited personal wealth and public investment 
to support them (Westwood, 2011). To achieve this UK administrations have 
encouraged the Third Sector to work in collaboration with both the public and private 
sectors (OTS, 2009; Lyon, 2013), often with funding only available through such 
arrangements that blur the boundaries of the sectors (Harris, 2010). Given these 
environmental pressures it is unsurprising to find that the importance of earned income 
as a revenue stream for TSOs appears to be increasing in recent years (Wilding et al., 
2006; Reichart et al., 2008; Teasdale, 2010). 
 
3. Problems Associated with the Market Orientated Approach  
 
The previous section noted how arguments relating to sustainability paint diversification 
of funding, such as the use of earned income from trading activities, in a positive light 
and a key aspect of social enterprise (Frumkin and Keating, 2011; Mswaka and Aluko, 
2014). There is, however, no guarantee that these sources of funds cannot be accessed 
without some compromises. The growing emphasis on generating revenue may lead to 
‘mission drift’ (McBrearty, 2007). It has been argued that the increasing adoption of 
profit maximising activities, for example, charging users for services that were formerly 
free (Cairns et al., 2006), increases the risk of compromising the principles, values and 
indeed the very social mission upon which these TSOs are founded (Bull and 
Crompton, 2006; Kong, 2010; Dees, 2004; Paton, 2003; Pearce, 2003). This may lead to 
certain goods and services no longer being supplied. Specifically goods and services 
with a public good nature, where the entire community benefits regardless of payment, 
such as provision of green or community areas. These may be passed over for imperfect 
substitutes, which possess private good characteristics, where only paying individual 
consumers within the community benefit and others can be excluded from such benefits 
(Alexander et al., 1999; Dees, 1998; Eikenberry and Kluver, 2003; Weisbrod, 2004).  
This difficulty in balancing the double bottom line of social mission delivery 
and commercialisation may force many TSOs, particularly those serving the most 
vulnerable and those that emphasise depth rather than breadth of outreach, to shun the 
traded income route and remained reliant largely on state and philanthropic support 
(Adamson, 2003; Pharoah et al., 2004; Tracey and Phillips, 2007; Oster et al., 2004; 
Mswaka and Aluko, 2014). This is evident from the data on Third Sector funding, 
which shows that despite the third sector’s increased use of earned income, it remains 
dependent on the public sector for support (Leyshon et al., 2003; Amin et al., 2002). 
Using data from the NSCSE’s forerunner, the National Survey of Third Sector 
Organisations (NSTSO), Clifford et al. (2010) indicate that around one in three of 
English TSOs receive public sector statutory funding, and one in seven state that this is 
their most important source of finance. Even where social enterprises adopt a primarily 
market orientated approach some studies have indicated a lack of sustainability without 
public sector support (Adamson and Byrne, 2003; Chell et al., 2005; Senyard et al., 
2007; Chell, 2007). The main reason for this continued reliance on public support is 
that, whilst generating extra income is undoubtedly important, not all TSOs find the 
traditional market orientated approach appropriate and require a new definition of 
market orientation that incorporates their obligations to society (Liao et al., 2001; 
Mswaka and Aluko, 2014). This may be more apparent in areas of high deprivation, 
where commercialisation is merely addressing the issue of breadth rather than depth, 
and therefore many vulnerable individuals are left without the provisions of goods and 
services (Schreiner, 2002; Westwood, 2011). This is discussed in more depth in section 
4.  
There may be a self-selection problem where TSOs ruled themselves partially or 
completely out of a more market orientated approach fearing that it may jeopardise their 
other sources of support (Easterly, and Miesing, 2009; Mswaka and Aluko, 2014). 
Although surplus from commercial activities is free from governmental targets and 
monitoring, providing greater autonomy to spend on achieving social objectives (Cairns 
et al., 2006; Kelly, 2007), appearing to be “too successful” or market orientated may 
threaten prospective grant assistance (Shaw, 2004; Bird and Aplin, 2007; Mswaka and 
Aluko, 2014). Studies such as Phillips (2006) have found that TSOs often wish to avoid 
mainstream business approaches, potentially missing out on private sector partnerships 
that could help service the communities they support (Adamson, 2003). A further 
incentive problem occurs when the increasing use of trading activities leads to 
volunteers, who effectively are the lifeblood of these organisations through their 
provision of free labour, questioning their involvement (Milligan and Fyfe, 2005). 
Given that Apinunmahakul et al. (2009) suggest time and monetary donations may be 
complements, this could have further ramifications. 
Thus the literature clearly indicates that despite the attractiveness and increasing 
popularity of the market orientated approach, reliance on public support remains strong 
amongst TSOs. The next section reviews the literature relating to local deprivation and 
its relationships with the use of traded income and government funding. 
 
4. Deprivation, Trading Income and Government Funding  
 
The Third Sector and social enterprise can be effective in overcoming both market and 
government failure within marginalised and deprived areas through the provision of 
missing services combined with economic and entrepreneurial benefits (Byrne et al., 
2006; Senyard et al., 2007). However, not only does the need for Third Sector 
intervention vary between different areas depending on their levels of deprivation (IFF 
Research, 2005), but the type of goods and services provided are also likely to differ 
greatly (Buckingham et al., 2010). This could influence the potential to use earned 
income as a revenue source depending on whether the mix of goods and services 
includes a greater proportion of those with public or private good natures (Fischer et al., 
2011). Low income and employment levels in more deprived areas limit the extent that 
user fees can be used (Seelos, and Mair, 2005), with much of the Third Sector income 
from trading activities in these areas originating from the public sector anyway 
(McBrearty, 2007). As well as greater demand for public funding support, on the supply 
side greater availability of such funding in more deprived areas may increase its use 
(Luksetich, 2008; Clifford et al., 2010), an issue that we consider in this paper. The 
social capital required to underpin community groups taking over the provision of some 
previously provided public services may also be lacking in more deprived areas 
(Sellick, 2014). Even where strong community bodies are present Sellick (2014) show 
the importance of public sector finance and practical support in passing responsibility 
for the running of services such as park and swimming facilities to community bodies. 
Evidence from the UK suggests that these factors combine in such a way to lead to a 
greater usage of public sector funding in more deprived areas (Clifford et al., 2010). 
However, the coalition has revealed financial plans to reduce funding to those social 
deprived local authority areas by 26 per cent over the next four years (Berman, and 
Keep, 2011). An alternative perspective is that an increase in the number of 
organisations providing services due to a favourable funding and political climate can 
lead to competition in obtaining future funding (Kerlin, and Pollak, 2011). 
As the TSOs in more deprived and remote areas are likely to rely more on public 
support and funding, and suffer from weaker connections to the outside business 
community (Amin et al., 2002), any cuts in public sector support are likely to affect 
these areas disproportionally. Where forced to move to a more business-orientated 
private sector based approach, this may result in a loss of focus on or achievement of 
social objectives (Bull and Crompton, 2006; Kong, 2010; Thompson and Williams, 
2014), which could reduce support for the Third Sector (Milligan and Fyfe, 2005). A 
counter argument is supplied by, Apinunmahakul et al.’s (2009) and Sokolowski’s 
(2013) findings that government expenditures can crowd out private citizen’s donations 
or cause a flight from certain activities, implying that removing this support may make 
community initiatives more self-sustaining. Overall the literature suggests that trading 
activities will play a lesser role and may be relatively rare in more deprived areas given 
the difficulties that TSOs have in adopting such approaches. Instead, the literature 
suggests that the third sector will be heavily reliant on public sector funding. However, 
to what extent a greater use of public sector funding reflects a greater need or 
availability is uncertain. The following section outlines the details of the analysis to be 
conducted exploring the relationships between funding choice and location outlined 
above. 
 
 
5. Data and Methodology 
 
The data utilised in this study is drawn from the 2010 National Survey of Charities and 
Social Enterprises (NSCSE), which was first conducted in 2008 under the title of the 
National Survey of Third Sector Organisations (NSTSO). The survey takes a relatively 
broad definition of the Third Sector. A majority of those organisations included had the 
legal form of charities, but the survey also included Companies Limited by Guarantee, 
Industrial and Provident Societies and Community Interest Companies (CIC). Appendix 
1 provides a brief overview of the differences of these non-charitable legal forms. 
112,796 TSOs were approached to complete the survey in September 2010, with 44,109 
responses, a response rate of 41 per cent (Ipsos MORI, 2013).  
The NSCSE captures considerable detail relating to the sources of finance that 
the organisations have sought and utilised. This allows the geographical patterns of 
trading activities and reliance on public funding to be examined. In order to split 
demand and supply, the attempted use of public funds and the perceived availability of 
public funding of the appropriate form is also explored. As sources of finance are likely 
to be related to the characteristics of the organisations a multivariate approach is most 
appropriate. The use of public sector finance has been investigated using earlier waves 
of the NSCSE by Clifford et al. (2010, 2013), however, the role of earned income as an 
alternative funding source was not examined in relation to this public sector reliance. 
 The analysis undertaken here makes use of the micro level NSCSE data. As well 
as TSO characteristics, a variety of other social and economic factors associated with 
the wider local authority community within which the TSO is based may also have an 
influence. Capturing all these unobserved influences may be difficult and in some cases 
not possible. To examine the influence of community deprivation on funding a 
multilevel mixed-effects binary logistic regression approach is adopted (Guo and Zhao, 
2000). This allows the relationship between local community deprivation and funding 
choices to be examined, whilst controlling for both organisation characteristics and 
unobserved social, economic and political influences at the wider local authority level. 
These regressions account for area (local authority) affects by treating the intercept term 
as a random coefficient, whilst TSOs’ characteristics are treated as fixed effects that are 
invariant between TSOs operating in different local authorities.   
A number of dependent variables are utilised to examine the relationship 
between deprivation, public funding and trading activities as an alternative source of 
income. The number of respondents to these items within the NSCSE that also provide 
full information with regard to the other organisational controls (see below) varies. In 
particular, the number of respondents providing information on satisfaction with the 
range of contracts and grants is relatively low, which is likely to reflect a lack of 
awareness of what funding is available. In order, to provide the most accurate estimates 
of the relationships of interest all observations available were retained rather than 
utilising a common subsample of those TSOs responding to all questions relating to 
funding sources. Initially the attempted use of public funding from local, national and 
all sources is examined (N = 21,942). To provide more clarity as to whether any 
location based differences in attempted use of public funds due to community 
deprivation are demand or supply driven, regressions are run using dissatisfaction with 
the range of grants and contracts from local and national public sector providers as 
dependent variables (N = 7711). Finally use of earned income as an alternative source of 
finance is explored (N = 23,780). 
The level of deprivation present within the local community within which the 
TSO is based is captured by the English Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 
(McLennan et al., 2011). The English IMD were originally released in 2004, and 
updated in 2007 and 2010. These capture deprivation in terms of seven domains: 
income; employment; health; education, skills and training; barriers to housing and 
services; crime; and the living environment.  A single overall measure of deprivation is 
generated based on these seven domains, and a score produced for areas at the Lower 
Layer Super Output Area (LSOA) geographical scale. LSOAs are generated from 
groups of Output Areas used to capture UK Census data. The Output Areas themselves 
are clusters of unit postcodes designed to be similar in population size and as socially 
homogeneous as possible, based on housing tenure and dwelling type. This results in the 
LSOAs having a minimum population of 1000 and a maximum of 3000 and although 
not representing any administrative units, they are as representative as possible of the 
local communities within which the population resides whilst retaining statistically 
usable population sizes. The IMD itself is not a linear scale. The 10 per cent of most 
deprived areas within each domain are allocated a score of 50 to 100, with the 
remaining 90 per cent of areas allocated score between 0 and 50. This makes it 
inappropriate to include the IMD within regressions as a continuous variable. Instead a 
set of dummies are included to capture those TSOs operating out of communities within 
differing ranges of deprivation.  
Given the differing potential to utilise social enterprise approaches in delivering 
some goods and services (Weisbrod, 1998; Liao et al., 2001; McBrearty, 2007), the 
regressions also control for the main users of the TSOs services. Respondents were 
required to select up to three main groups of users from a long list of potential users. 
The number of options available and close relationships to one another make it 
impractical to include variables in the regression representing all possible groups, due to 
reduced degrees of freedom and collinearity problems. In order to avoid this principal 
component analysis (PCA) is used to identify important sets of users to be included in 
the regression. A varimax rotation is utilised to ensure that the components representing 
the different groups are not correlated and provide a set of more distinct user groups. 
The scores for each TSO are generated using the Anderson-Rubin approach as is 
appropriate given the need for non-correlated factor scores (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2007). 
 Other organisational controls include: legal form; number of volunteers; income 
level; and geographical scope of activities (local, regional, national or international). All 
of these measures are likely to influence the resources available to the TSO and its 
potential to draw in further funding of all types. Although it might be expected that 
there would be a close association between these measures, the diverse nature, 
principles and priorities of the Third Sector meant that as with other variables included, 
no evidence of collinearity problems were evident in the variance inflation factors 
(VIF). As well as these more objective measures two further measures were included, 
which may influence the organisations’ perceptions of funding availability, their 
perceptions of their success over the last 12 months in meeting their objectives, and 
their satisfaction with their ability to influence local policy-makers.   
 
6. Results and Analysis 
 
Initially it is worth considering the basic patterns of reliance on public sector funding by 
deprivation of the local community (Table 1). The proportion of TSOs that have never 
bid for public sector funding falls on a monotonic basis as the deprivation of the local 
community within which they are based increases. This is the case regardless of whether 
local, national or all public sector funding is considered. For example, nearly half of the 
TSOs based in the least deprived areas have not bid for public funds, whilst only one in 
five of those in the most deprived areas have not sought to access public funds. Given 
the size of the differences in the proportions avoiding the use of public sector funds 
between local communities of differing levels of deprivation it is no surprise that the 
chi-square tests indicate a significant relationship for all three measures. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
As noted above the much smaller proportion of TSOs that do not seek funding in the 
most deprived local communities in England is not necessarily only a reflection of the 
need for public support to enable social enterprise to flourish in areas where the need for 
their output is greatest (Amin et al., 2002; Adamson and Byrne, 2003), but could also 
reflect the availability of such funding (Luksetich, 2008). In order to examine whether 
the differences in the proportion of TSOs not applying for public funds found in Table 1 
above, are purely a reflection of the supply of funds, Table 2 below reports the 
percentage of TSOs indicating dissatisfaction with the range of grants and contracts 
available by local community deprivation. Were the lower proportion of TSOs not using 
public funds in more deprived local areas purely a reflection of supply differences, it 
would be expected that fewer TSOs in deprived communities would be dissatisfied with 
the range of funding available. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Rather than TSOs in more deprived areas being less likely to be dissatisfied with the 
public funding available, nearly two in three respondents (59.1 per cent) indicate 
dissatisfaction with the range of local grants available, compared to under half of those 
TSOs operating out of less deprived communities (41.3 per cent in areas with IMD of 
less than 5, and 48.6 per cent of TSOs in areas with IMD scores of 5 to 10). A very 
similar pattern of dissatisfaction with the local contracts available is also evident. The 
variation in dissatisfaction with national grants and contracts by local community 
deprivation is also significant, but the difference in proportions is smaller.  
The government’s desire for TSOs to become more sustainable and reduced 
their reliance on public funds in a period of austerity, has seen social enterprise, and 
trading activities in particular, as one potential solution (Austin et al., 2006; Birch, and 
Whittam, 2006; Amin, 2009). As a key component of social enterprise it is of great 
interest to observe the extent that TSOs operating within more deprived areas have been 
able to diversify their funding sources through the use of income from trading activities 
(Frumkin, and Keating, 2011). The figures in Table 3 suggest that only around one in 
five TSOs use trading activities as a source of income (20.8 per cent). This drops to less 
than one in ten when considered as the main source of funding (8.2 per cent).  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
What is interesting is that the deprivation of the local community within which a TSO is 
based appears to be no further barrier to use of trading activities, as nearly twice the 
proportion of TSOs in the most deprived areas within the sample incorporate trading 
activities into their operations (38.5 per cent) as found for the whole sample. Similarly 
even though only around one in six TSOs in the most deprived areas use trading 
activities as their main source of funding, this is still three times the proportion in the 
least deprived areas (5.3 per cent). 
These descriptive results whilst providing an indication of the funding patterns 
relating to those TSOs operating in the most deprived areas of England, may not 
provide the full picture. The characteristics of the TSOs may understandably vary 
between the most and least deprived areas and influence the extent that they are able to 
avoid public sector funding. In order to account for these organisational influences a 
multivariate approach must be adopted. However, as noted in the preceding section it is 
first necessary to identify the main groups of users of the TSOs using Principal 
Components Analysis. There are no problems with the Bartlett test and the Keiser-
Meyer-Olkin test suggests that although exceeding the minimum of 0.5 (Kaiser, 1974) 
that the data is mediocre with a result of 0.664 (Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999). The 
number of factors to be extracted was determined using Cattell’s (1966) approach based 
on the inflection point of the scree plot of eigenvalues in preference to Kaiser’s (1960) 
criterion of retain all factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. This is because two 
additional factors had eigenvalues just over 1, but items cross loaded on these factors 
and others.  This led to four principal components being extracted by the analysis. The 
components captured the following groups of users: minority groups and those affected 
by crime, as perpetrators or victims; the general public as a whole; those with physical 
or mental difficulties; children, younger people and their carers (Table 4). 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Table 5 presents the multilevel logistic regression results estimating the decision not to 
use public sector funding. The Wald-tests of joint significance suggest that the null of 
no relationship between the TSO characteristics and the probability of bidding for 
public funding can be rejected for all three equations, as is the case for all estimations 
that follow. As outlined in the preceding section the choice of the multi-level logistic 
regression allows for unobserved social, economic and political differences in the local 
authority environment to be accounted for. The Likelihood Ratio tests comparing the 
multilevel regressions to standard logistic regressions all indicate that the null can be 
rejected, suggesting that unobserved environmental influences at the local authority 
level do play a significant role in determining the likelihood of not bidding for public 
funding sources.  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Confirming the descriptive results above, after controlling for TSO characteristics those 
organisations operating in progressively more deprived areas are significantly more 
likely to have bid for public sector money. Consistent with previous research there is 
clearly a dependency on public funding in these areas (Clifford et al., 2010). This 
suggests that although income from trading activities was found to be utilised across 
both affluent and less prosperous areas alike by the Third Sector, it appears that a move 
away from public funding will disproportionally affect poorer areas. This is consistent 
with those studies that have highlighted the difficulties of communities in more 
deprived areas taking over the roles played by the public sector as social capital cannot 
be created from the outside (Westwood, 2011), and practical skills need knowledge 
need to be developed through partnership with the public sector (Sellick, 2014). 
As expected it is found that the main users of the TSOs’ outputs have a 
significant influence on the probability of not attempting to access public funding. 
Where the groups concerned require more specialist services or are harder to reach the 
probability of avoiding public funding is reduced. The relationship between size and 
public funding appears to be non-linear. While smaller TSOs in terms of volunteer 
numbers (no volunteers) and income (£1 to £5000) are more likely to have never tried to 
access public funds, larger organisations in terms of having an international scope also 
appear to be less likely to have bid for public funding. The lack of attempted use of 
public funding by smaller TSOs may reflect the increasing complexity of the process of 
bidding for and administrating public funding sources (Senyard et al., 2007; Muñoz, 
2009).  
For national funding sources in particular, TSOs which are both successful and 
unsuccessful in meeting their objectives appear to be less likely to have sought funding. 
Potentially this could reflect a lack of need from those that are more successful. A lack 
of knowledge of what is available might be the reason for those which are less 
successful not bidding and perhaps they would benefit from additional resources. A 
result, which may influence the next set of results relating to dissatisfaction with the 
range of grants and contracts available, is that those who are dissatisfied with their 
influence on policy makers are less likely to have avoided trying to use public funds. 
Again this highlights the value of partnerships and exchange between the third and 
public sector at the local level (Sellick, 2014).    
 Table 6 indicates that with the exception of dissatisfaction with national 
contracts there is little evidence of local authority environmental factors having a 
significant impact on the probability that TSOs are dissatisfied with the public sources 
of funding available. For local grants and contracts this is a particularly interesting 
result as it might have been expected that variations in the outsourcing of particular 
services might have generated a significant likelihood ratio test result for dissatisfaction 
with local contracts available at the very least. It is perhaps suggestive of strong 
communication between local authorities with regard to best practices and experiences 
of outsourcing activities, alongside directives from central government.  
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
The results suggest that for TSOs operating in more deprived local communities the 
reduced likelihood of being able to avoid public sector funding found in Table 5 is not a 
supply driven effect. Even though more funding may be available for TSOs operating in 
these areas (Clifford et al., 2010), the dissatisfaction with the range of grants and 
contracts available is significantly higher for TSOs in these areas. The results indicate 
this effect is particularly strong for those TSOs operating from the most deprived areas 
(IMD 65+). The result is apparent for both local and national sources, and present 
regardless of whether grants or contracts are being considered. This implies that not 
only are these organisations more likely to have attempted to access public funds, and 
would therefore be most likely to be affected by their withdrawal, what is currently 
available still does not necessarily fit with their needs (Westwood, 2011). In general this 
dissatisfaction also increases for larger more complex TSOs. From the perspective of 
the TSOs, it also seems that where objectives have not been met fully, dissatisfaction 
with the resources available from the public sector are also greater.  
The potential to use trading activities to move towards a more social enterprise 
orientated approach to Third Sector funding does appear to vary across local authorities 
(Table 7), implying that factors such as economic conditions, cultural attitudes and the 
political regime in place affect the practicality of such an approach. As found with the 
descriptive results in Tables 1 to 3 above, after controlling for TSO characteristics the 
slightly contrary result of greater trading income usage in more deprived local 
communities, remains. This means that although TSOs in more deprived areas are less 
likely to have avoided bidding for public funding, and imply an on-going need for 
further alternative sources of public funds, they are also embracing trading activities as 
an alternative source of income. 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
The results taken in combination imply that there is no lack of willingness to utilise 
social enterprise approaches within the Third Sector, particularly in those areas with the 
greatest need for their services. However, the potential to continue to move towards this 
model of the third sector is limited, as the reliance on public funds and requirement for 
alternative sources of public funding in order to achieve their objectives, mean that 
trading activities are just one part of the model adopted by TSOs in deprived areas. This 
is often reflected in the findings of other studies where TSOs are unwilling to appear too 
market orientated (Mswaka and Aluko, 2014). Another key plank as found in prior 
studies, such as Adamson and Byrne (2003), appears to remain the support of public 
funding. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper has examined the potential for TSOs to adopt a more social enterprise 
orientated approach including the use of earned income from trading activities to 
replace the resources currently provided by the public sector, particularly in the more 
deprived areas of England. The results have shown that private sector approaches have 
been widely adopted and embraced by the Third Sector both in more affluent and less 
successful local economies. However, there is evidence that those TSOs operating in 
more deprived areas are more likely to have attempted to use public funding either in 
the form of contracts or grants. It is probable that some of this reflects supply driven 
influences, regarding their ability to apply for and access a wider range of resources 
from local and central government. However, the study has shown that even this 
increased supply does not entirely satisfy demand, with more dissatisfaction with the 
public sector finance available in these areas. This is an issue which is likely to intensify 
if social funding for deprived areas is further cut (Berman and Keep, 2011). 
All of the results indicate that trading activities whilst being widely accepted by 
the Third Sector are still likely to require heavy subsidisation particularly in the most 
deprived areas of England. Without these subsidies from either the public sector or the 
wider community such an approach looks to be largely unsustainable (Westwood, 
2011). In particular, those serving harder to reach groups appear to be both more 
dissatisfied with the public funding that is presently available and are also more likely 
to have tried to access such funding. This suggests that were public funding to be 
reduced further to meet the needs of reducing central government spending, it is vital 
that what funding is retained is specifically targeted at these organisations, as it is 
unlikely that other sources of funding, such as social enterprise and trading activities, 
can take over. Other studies have found TSOs may avoid taking more market orientated 
approaches for fear of limiting access to public support (Mswaka and Aluko, 2014), 
which suggests local policymakers need to adjust their funding approaches to 
accommodate the new forms of hybrid TSOs coming to the fore. Support for more 
market orientated TSOs needs to be communicated. At the same time the community 
cannot be expected to take over public services without adequate practical support 
(Sellick, 2014) and an acceptance that social capital which may support TSO activities 
is not created overnight, but needs nurturing through public support and investment 
(Westwood, 2011). In terms of local community based social enterprise there is some 
evidence that these smaller operations can avoid the need to utilise public funds, but 
they may lack the capacity in terms of skills and resources required to fully meet the 
needs of those living in more deprived local communities (Amin et al., 2002; Chell et 
al., 2005; Chell, 2007). 
Further work would be advised to look in more detail at the combinations of 
funding utilised by organisations to determine the complementarities between funding 
sources within the Third Sector. The data collected by the NSCSE although providing a 
large sample size may not provide the fine detail required to fully understand the 
proportion of funding accessed from different sources, and the (perceived) availability 
of sources of funding for individual organisations. It may therefore require more 
focused primary data collection to understand these interactions. The changing status of 
TSO’s legitimacy with different stakeholder groups is also something that needs further 
investigation. As the economy has weakened the electorate as a whole has seen 
priorities alter and TSOs may be less appealing without subsidy. Even more importantly 
volunteers may turn away from more commercially orientated organisations. It is 
important that such attitudes are monitored through time. Clearly trading activities offer 
a valuable source of funding for the Third Sector, but it is clear that the Third Sector 
cannot rely upon it solely.  
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Appendix 1 – Non-charity legal forms 
Companies Limited by Guarantee (CLGs) and Community Interest Companies (CICs) 
are private limited companies and can borrow against their assets. CLGs can produce a 
surplus to fund activities, but this cannot be distributed. The CLG form protects trustees 
of organisations from liability where they are likely to enter into contracts relating to 
employment or property (BIS, 2011a). CIC is the legal form developed for social 
enterprises. CICs do not have to be established for charitable purposes, but any lawful 
purpose as long as they are run clearly for the benefit of a community. They may even 
pay dividends in some cases, but their primary objective should not be to create wealth 
for owners and assets cannot be transferred (BIS, 2011a; Regulator of Community 
Interest Companies, 2010). Industrial and Provident Societies are run by and for the 
mutual benefit of their members rather than outside investors. Surpluses can be 
distributed to members, but are usual reinvested in the society (BIS, 2011a, 2011b). 
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Table 1 – Proportion of TSOs never bidding or applying for public funds by deprivation 
of the local area as measured by the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 
 
 
Local Funds National Funds All Funds N 
0 to 5 IMD 48.3% 64.5% 42.5% 1,618 
5 to 10 IMD 45.5% 61.8% 40.6% 4,116 
10 to 15 IMD 42.9% 56.6% 37.3% 4,098 
15 to 25 IMD 39.4% 51.0% 33.6% 4,883 
25 to 50 IMD 30.5% 39.7% 24.8% 5,598 
50 to 65 IMD 23.3% 32.0% 18.5% 1,179 
65+ IMD 17.3% 28.2% 13.6% 450 
All 38.3% 50.7% 32.8% 21,942 
    
 
Chi-square 540.9 911.6 568.7 
 
[d.f] [6] [6] [6]  
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
Table 2 – Dissatisfaction with Range of Local and National Public Funding Available 
by deprivation of the local area as measured by the Index of Multiple Deprivation 
(IMD) 
 
 
Local 
Grants 
National 
Grants 
Local 
Contracts 
National 
Contracts N 
0 to 5 IMD 41.3% 48.3% 43.2% 48.6% 329 
5 to 10 IMD 48.6% 49.3% 49.7% 49.8% 903 
10 to 15 IMD 50.7% 54.0% 51.8% 55.8% 1,088 
15 to 25 IMD 52.8% 51.7% 54.2% 55.6% 1,634 
25 to 50 IMD 54.6% 55.1% 59.5% 59.4% 2,751 
50 to 65 IMD 52.9% 54.3% 57.6% 56.7% 698 
65+ IMD 59.1% 57.8% 62.7% 61.0% 308 
All 52.4% 53.3% 55.4% 56.3% 7,711 
   
 
 
 
Chi-square 33.4 17.5 65.4 37.3 
 
[d.f] [6] [6] [6] [6]  
(p-value) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
 
Table 3 – Trading Activities as a Source of Income by deprivation of the local area as 
measured by the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 
 
 
Source of Income 
Main Source of 
Income N 
0 to 5 IMD 12.0% 5.3% 1,744 
5 to 10 IMD 13.5% 5.5% 4,444 
10 to 15 IMD 16.6% 6.3% 4,440 
15 to 25 IMD 19.9% 7.4% 5,309 
25 to 50 IMD 27.8% 11.1% 6,074 
50 to 65 IMD 36.2% 14.3% 1,283 
65+ IMD 38.5% 16.5% 486 
All 20.8% 8.2% 23,780 
   
 
Chi-square 731.4 265.7 
 
[d.f] [6] [6]  
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
 
 
 
Table 4 – Factor loadings for principal component analysis of the main users of 
individual TSOs 
 
  1 2 3 4 
General Public/Everyone (Reversed) -0.020 -0.005 0.196 0.477 
Women 0.066 0.889 -0.051 0.015 
Men 0.071 0.894 -0.039 0.018 
Older people 0.020 0.498 0.159 -0.024 
Children (Under 16 Years of Age) -0.027 -0.057 -0.086 0.833 
Young People (Aged 16 to 24 Years) 0.133 0.086 -0.129 0.695 
Those with physical disabilities -0.009 0.032 0.737 0.098 
Those requiring particular physical help 0.081 0.076 0.572 -0.030 
Those with learning difficulties 0.092 -0.015 0.670 0.102 
Those with mental health needs 0.286 0.037 0.493 -0.049 
Members of ethnic minorities 0.397 0.095 0.064 0.108 
People with a particular financial need 0.334 0.013 0.082 -0.002 
Asylum seekers and refugees 0.481 0.026 0.010 0.036 
Homeless people 0.531 -0.044 -0.037 -0.042 
Those with addiction problems 0.594 -0.024 0.034 -0.047 
Lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender  0.448 0.102 0.122 0.034 
Socially excluded and vulnerable people 0.499 -0.022 0.126 0.041 
Victims of crime 0.514 0.070 0.067 0.030 
Offenders and ex-offenders 0.588 -0.005 -0.002 0.012 
Carers and parents 0.056 -0.030 0.274 0.361 
     
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 103,771 [180] (0.000)  
     
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 0.664    
Notes: degrees of freedom in squared brackets; p-values in parentheses 
 
Table 5 – Logit regressions of never having bid for local or national funding 
 
Never Bid for 
Local Funds 
Never Bid for 
National 
Funds 
Never Bid for 
Local or 
National 
Funds 
Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 
[base category IMD 5 to 10] 
   
IMD 0.1 to 5 0.1343 0.1146 0.0860 (0.030) (0.072) (0.170) 
IMD 10 to 15 -0.1251 -0.1846 -0.1456 (0.008) (0.000) (0.002) 
IMD 15 to 25 -0.2339 -0.3266 -0.2529 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMD 25 to 50 -0.5500 -0.6377 -0.5772 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMD 50 to 65 -0.7480 -0.8467 -0.7968 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMD 65+ -1.0381 -0.9727 -1.0876 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Main Users of TSO’s goods/services    
Minority Groups -0.2021 -0.1883 -0.2329 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
General Public 0.0445 0.0255 0.0381 (0.003) (0.078) (0.013) 
Mental or Physical Disabilities -0.1774 -0.1109 -0.1948 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Young People or Carers -0.2037 -0.1555 -0.2174 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volunteers  
[base category 1 to 10 Volunteers] 
   
No Volunteers 0.3164 0.5466 0.4336 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
11 to 20 Volunteers -0.1227 -0.1001 -0.1378 (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) 
21 or more Volunteers -0.0029 -0.0538 -0.0288 (0.938) (0.136) (0.450) 
Notes: degrees of freedom in squared brackets; p-values in parentheses 
Table 5 – continued 
 
Never Bid for 
Local Funds 
Never Bid for 
National 
Funds 
Never Bid for 
Local or 
National 
Funds 
Geographical Scope [base category 
Local] 
   
International 1.3334 0.4712 0.9418 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
National 0.7465 -0.0189 0.5048 
 (0.000) (0.735) (0.000) 
Regional 0.1410 -0.2083 0.0890 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.060) 
    
Income [base category £5001 to 
£30,000]    
No Income -0.1954 -0.2756 -0.1800 (0.033) (0.002) (0.055) 
£1 to £5000 Income 0.1814 0.2291 0.2061 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
£30,001 to £100,000 Income -0.3379 -0.2394 -0.3654 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
£100,001 to £1 million Income -0.4513 -0.5499 -0.5234 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
£1 million + Income -0.7466 -0.8747 -0.8584 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Charity -0.0485 0.0396 -0.0401 (0.252) (0.334) (0.361) 
Success in Meeting Objectives [base 
category successful] 
   
Very Successful  -0.1749 -0.1272 -0.2072 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Not Very Successful  -0.1172 -0.2079 -0.0784 (0.116) (0.004) (0.302) 
Not Successful at All  -0.1681 -0.2969 -0.2003 (0.305) (0.062) (0.233) 
Notes: degrees of freedom in squared brackets; p-values in parentheses 
Table 5 – continued 
 
Never Bid 
for Local 
Funds 
Never Bid 
for National 
Funds 
Never Bid 
for Local or 
National 
Funds 
Satisfaction with Local Influence 
[base category neither satisfied or 
dissatisfied]    
Very Satisfied  -0.1298 -0.0846 -0.0579 
 (0.131) (0.317) (0.510) 
Fairly Satisfied  -0.2787 -0.2938 -0.2504 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fairly Dissatisfied  -0.4304 -0.4551 -0.4535 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Very Dissatisfied  -0.3119 -0.4282 -0.3076 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Constant 0.2323 0.9165 0.0542 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.427) 
    
N 21,942 21,942 21,942 
    
Wald Test of joint Significance 
1683.1 1697.7 1624.9 
[29] [29] [29] 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Likelihood Ratio test of Area Effects 84.5 87.52 82.8 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: degrees of freedom in squared brackets; p-values in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 – Logit regressions of dissatisfaction with range of public funding 
 
Local 
Grants 
National 
Grants 
Local 
Contracts 
National 
Contracts 
Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 
[base category IMD 5 to 10] 
  
 
 
IMD 0.1 to 5 -0.3398 -0.0321 -0.2997 -0.0501 (0.016) (0.817) (0.034) (0.722) 
IMD 10 to 15 0.0451 0.1619 0.0369 0.2105 (0.645) (0.095) (0.708) (0.033) 
IMD 15 to 25 0.1400 0.0633 0.1341 0.1857 (0.123) (0.482) (0.142) (0.043) 
IMD 25 to 50 0.2059 0.2082 0.3593 0.3371 (0.015) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMD 50 to 65 0.1098 0.1504 0.2272 0.1631 (0.325) (0.176) (0.045) (0.153) 
IMD 65+ 0.4342 0.3346 0.5155 0.4172 (0.003) (0.022) (0.001) (0.006) 
Main Users of TSO’s goods/services     
Minority Groups 0.0429 0.0470 0.0895 0.1005 (0.015) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
General Public -0.0222 -0.0114 -0.0330 -0.0340 (0.386) (0.653) (0.203) (0.190) 
Mental or Physical Disabilities 0.0224 0.0214 0.0525 0.0837 (0.249) (0.265) (0.008) (0.000) 
Young People or Carers -0.0274 -0.0804 -0.0090 -0.0279 (0.244) (0.001) (0.704) (0.240) 
Volunteers  
[base category 1 to 10 Volunteers] 
    
No Volunteers -0.3429 -0.1071 -0.2743 -0.2782 (0.042) (0.517) (0.107) (0.102) 
11 to 20 Volunteers 0.0859 0.0924 0.1235 0.0123 (0.183) (0.148) (0.058) (0.850) 
21 or more Volunteers 0.2494 0.2492 0.1681 0.1846 (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.003) 
Notes: degrees of freedom in squared brackets; p-values in parentheses  
Table 6 – continued 
 
Local 
Grants 
National 
Grants 
Local 
Contracts 
National 
Contracts 
Geographical Scope [base category 
Local] 
    
International 0.4087 0.3756 0.1664 0.1521 
 (0.017) (0.026) (0.331) (0.376) 
National 0.1858 0.1524 0.1555 0.2044 
 (0.043) (0.096) (0.096) (0.030) 
Regional 0.1633 0.0495 0.1891 0.1391 
 (0.016) (0.461) (0.006) (0.044) 
Income [base category £5001 to 
£30,000]   
 
 
No Income 0.3299 0.0748 0.3353 0.2266 (0.055) (0.655) (0.058) (0.194) 
£1 to £5000 Income -0.0704 -0.0389 -0.1173 0.0049 (0.473) (0.688) (0.234) (0.961) 
£30,001 to £100,000 Income 0.1634 0.0786 0.1384 0.0927 (0.049) (0.338) (0.098) (0.269) 
£100,001 to £1 million Income 0.1419 0.0742 0.1381 0.1769 (0.055) (0.312) (0.065) (0.018) 
£1 million + Income -0.1627 -0.1636 -0.2346 -0.0992 (0.090) (0.085) (0.015) (0.305) 
     
Charity -0.0969 -0.1139 -0.1651 -0.2778 (0.140) (0.079) (0.013) (0.000) 
Success in Meeting Objectives 
[base category successful] 
    
Very Successful  -0.1450 -0.1095 -0.1822 -0.1289 (0.005) (0.033) (0.000) (0.014) 
Not Very Successful  0.1617 0.0517 0.4275 0.3636 (0.206) (0.681) (0.001) (0.007) 
Not Successful at All  1.2540 0.4167 1.5893 0.5813 (0.001) (0.168) (0.000) (0.084) 
Notes: degrees of freedom in squared brackets; p-values in parentheses 
Table 6 – continued 
 
Local 
Grants 
National 
Grants 
Local 
Contracts 
National 
Contracts 
Satisfaction with Local 
Influence [base category neither 
satisfied or dissatisfied]   
 
 
Very Satisfied  -0.5523 -0.3492 -0.4651 -0.3851 
 (0.001) (0.025) (0.003) (0.013) 
Fairly Satisfied  -0.1765 -0.1028 -0.1494 -0.0511 
 (0.010) (0.126) (0.027) (0.446) 
Fairly Dissatisfied  1.1467 1.1384 1.1481 1.2110 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Very Dissatisfied  2.0031 1.8225 1.9935 2.0870 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Constant -0.6976 -0.5958 -0.5506 -0.5260 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
N 7,711 7,711 7,711 7,711 
   
 
 
Wald Test of joint Significance 
1064.7 920.5 1054.4 1036.9 
[29] [29] [29] [29] 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
   
 
 Likelihood Ratio test of Area 
Effects 
0 1.28 0.92 4.26 
(1.000) (0.129) (0.169) (0.020) 
Notes: degrees of freedom in squared brackets; p-values in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 – Logit regressions of trading activities as a source of income 
 
Source of Income 
Main Source of 
Income 
Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 
[base category IMD 5 to 10] 
  
IMD 0.1 to 5 -0.1566 -0.0382 (0.089) (0.771) 
IMD 10 to 15 0.1722 0.0459 (0.008) (0.628) 
IMD 15 to 25 0.3071 0.1231 (0.000) (0.167) 
IMD 25 to 50 0.5046 0.3347 (0.000) (0.000) 
IMD 50 to 65 0.7791 0.4699 (0.000) (0.000) 
IMD 65+ 0.7985 0.5826 (0.000) (0.000) 
Main Users of TSO’s goods/services   
Minority Groups 0.0877 0.0865 (0.000) (0.000) 
General Public -0.1183 -0.0918 (0.000) (0.000) 
Mental or Physical Disabilities 0.1578 0.1881 (0.000) (0.000) 
Young People or Carers 0.0276 0.0112 (0.105) (0.644) 
Volunteers  
[base category 1 to 10 Volunteers] 
  
No Volunteers 0.0600 0.3739 (0.577) (0.002) 
11 to 20 Volunteers -0.2943 -0.5609 (0.000) (0.000) 
21 or more Volunteers -0.2629 -0.8508 (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: degrees of freedom in squared brackets; p-values in parentheses 
Table 7 – continued 
 Source of Income 
Main Source of 
Income 
Geographical Scope [base category 
Local] 
  
International -0.6476 -0.8147 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
National 0.0847 -0.1353 
 (0.186) (0.143) 
Regional 0.3929 0.3424 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Income [base category £5001 to £30,000]   
No Income -0.3118 -0.6344 (0.036) (0.007) 
£1 to £5000 Income -0.1454 -0.4174 (0.044) (0.000) 
£30,001 to £100,000 Income 0.6926 0.3776 (0.000) (0.000) 
£100,001 to £1 million Income 1.5737 1.1399 (0.000) (0.000) 
£1 million + Income 2.3184 2.0257 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Charity -0.3984 -0.5344 (0.000) (0.000) 
Success in Meeting Objectives [base 
category successful] 
  
Very Successful  0.0931 0.0415 (0.011) (0.424) 
Not Very Successful  -0.1656 -0.1060 (0.102) (0.452) 
Not Successful at All  -0.7470 -1.2547 (0.008) (0.015) 
Notes: degrees of freedom in squared brackets; p-values in parentheses  
Table 7 – continued 
 Source of Income 
Main Source of 
Income 
Satisfaction with Local Influence 
[base category neither satisfied or 
dissatisfied]   
Very Satisfied  0.1412 -0.0230 
 (0.177) (0.881) 
Fairly Satisfied  0.0903 -0.0784 
 (0.063) (0.266) 
Fairly Dissatisfied  0.2821 0.1763 
 (0.000) (0.006) 
Very Dissatisfied  0.0945 0.1596 
 (0.099) (0.042) 
   
Constant -2.2728 -2.5976 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
N 23,780 23,780 
   
Wald Test of joint Significance 
3040.3 1538.0 
[29] [29] 
(0.000) (0.000) 
   
Likelihood Ratio test of Area Effects 22.31 8.4 (0.000) (0.002) 
Notes: degrees of freedom in squared brackets; p-values in parentheses  
 
 
 
